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Scarring Effects of the First Labor Market Experience
* 
 
The paper studies the relationship between teenagers’ first labor market experience and 
subsequent labor market performance using data on all Swedish youths graduating from 
vocational high schools in the recession years of 1991-94. Sibling fixed-effects combined with 
detailed data on high school programs, grades and work experience during high school are 
used in order to identify the causal long-run effects of post-graduation unemployment. The 
results show significant scarring effects resulting in higher risks of unemployment up to 5 
years later. The results imply that poor labor market performance as a teenager result in 
persistent, but not permanent, negative effects. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Young workers have higher entry rates into unemployment and  higher exit rates out-of 
unemployment than older workers. As a result, young worker in general have relatively 
short unemployment spells which may suggest that youth unemployment is a harmless state 
requiring little attention from the policymakers. Nevertheless, most countries provide 
specific active labor market programs targeted at young workers. One possible rationale for 
policymakers’ focus on youth unemployment is that some young workers may experience 
very long-term negative effects even from short unemployment spells, a phenomenon 
usually referred to as “state dependence” or “scarring”.  
There is also a large literature on the long-term consequences of unemployment. The 
results in most previous studies suggest that unemployment do indeed have persistent 
negative effects, at least for prime aged workers. Less is known about the consequences for 
young workers, even though scarring of young workers were the focus of early papers such 
as Ellwood (1982). The literature is plagued by the inherent difficulties facing 
econometricians due to problems with unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated effects will 
be larger than the true effects if workers differ in their underlying probability of being 
unemployed for reasons that we are unable to control for. Thus, separating the effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity from the causal effects of previous unemployment (i.e. the true 
scarring effect) is a fundamental problem in this literature.  
This paper explores uniquely rich data containing detailed information on the 
characteristics for four full Swedish birth cohorts of young people in the process of entering 
the labor market through vocational high schools. The data cover aspects such as field of 
study, work-related educational performance, occupation specific labor market conditions, 
in school work experience, and family identifiers. We study the relationship between early   3
labor market conditions and future outcomes using sibling fixed effects to remove the full 
impact of family background and the detailed individual information to control for 
differences between siblings. The identifying assumption is that the individual level 
covariates together with sibling fixed effects capture relevant persistent heterogeneity. The 
detailed individual level information have a large impact on the variable of interest in 
models without sibling fixed effects, but only a minor impact once sibling fixed effects are 
included. This suggests that the within-family-comparisons model is indeed a powerful tool 
for removing a potential bias stemming from individual heterogeneity. The results show that 
unemployment subsequent to graduation gives rise to significant “scars” that decline over 
time but which remain for at least 5 years after the initial unemployment experience. Further 
results suggest that both the incidence and duration matter, but that the impact of short spells 
vanishes more quickly than that of longer spells. 
Since the sibling fixed effects model substantially reduces the sample size and the 
degrees of freedom, we also estimate models controlling for observable family background 
instead of the sibling fixed effects. This introduces a bias to the estimates but increases the 
precision which allows us to study the effects in smaller sub-samples. The results indicate 
that the long run effects of teenage unemployment are similar across various sub-groups 
defined by gender, ethnicity or business-cycle at the time of labor market entry.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section II gives the institutional background and 
Section III defines the empirical model. Section IV describes the data and presents some 
descriptive statistics. Section V shows the sibling fixed effects estimates and Section VI 
show sub-sample estimates. Section VII concludes.   4
II. BACKGROUND 
Previous literature 
Unemployment may have negative effects on future labor market performance for several 
different reasons: A first explanation has to do with human capital, either due to the forgone 
work experience during the unemployment spell or, perhaps more seriously, if people’s 
skills actually deteriorate during a spell of inactivity as suggested by Edin and Gustavsson 
(2008). It is thus possible that (the market value of) skills acquired during high school may 
depreciate relatively fast unless the skills are used.  
Second, if hiring takes place under uncertainty about worker productivity, employers may 
use previous unemployment spells as a screening device in their hiring process and thus 
prefer to hire workers with shorter unemployment histories.
1  
Third, institutions such as seniority rules that protect workers with long tenure on the 
expense of short tenured workers will give those receiving jobs early an advantage over 
those receiving their jobs later. This advantage may be important whenever a firm is hit by 
negative a shock later, which is consistent with results found in Eliason and Storrie, (2006).  
Finally, very young workers’ preferences for work and leisure may be influenced by their 
early experiences. Some support in this direction can be found in the literature on social 
interactions as in Kolm (2005) and Stutzer and Lalive (2003) which argue that the stigma of 
unemployment is affected by the labor market position of the reference group and that a 
smaller stigma may lower the outflow from unemployment. If unemployment per se causes 
teenagers to spend more time with other unemployed people, they may eventually have a 
                                                   
1 In a survey of Swedish firms by Agell and Bennmarker (2002), employers confirm this idea. Further support is found in 
Eriksson and Lagerström (2004) who show that unemployed job seekers receive fewer job contacts than employed job 
seekers even after controlling for all information available to the employers using data from a Swedish “applicant data 
base”.   5
reference group with weaker labor force attachment. According to the above logic, this 
could reduce the stigma of unemployment and thus also the incentive to work. 
The empirical literature on scarring or “state-dependence” dates back to the early 1980s 
with papers by Ellwood (1982), Corcoran (1982) and Heckman and Borjas (1980). The 
papers by Ellwood and Heckman and Borjas clearly identified the empirical obstacles that 
must be overcome in order to identify causal (or “true”) state dependence. The basic 
problem is to separate causal effects from unobserved heterogeneity since any unobserved 
characteristics that causes a person to be unemployed at one point in time is likely to do so 
also in the future. There are basically three solutions that have been applied in the empirical 
literature: i) rely on observable characteristics ii) use aggregate unemployment as an 
instrumental variable or iii) make distributional assumptions regarding the unobserved 
component.  
Ellwood (1982) studies US data from the NLSY and concludes that the effect of early 
non-employment on future employment probability is small but that the effect on wages is 
large. Corcoran (1982) studies a NLS sample of women and reaches similar conclusions 
regarding wages but also finds evidence of persistent negative employment effects. 
Heckman and Borjas (1980), in their empirical application, find little evidence of true state 
dependence. A recent study on US data is Mroz and Savage (2006) that use data from the 
NLSY in a dynamic model with lagged instruments and find significant effects four years 
after an unemployment spell on both annual earnings (approximately 1% from 10 weeks of 
unemployment) and the unemployment probability (4% from 10 weeks of unemployment). 
Evidence suggesting that unemployment may affect future wages through “implicit 
contracts” can be found in the paper by Beadry and DiNardo (1991) who show that wages 
are affected by the aggregate unemployment rate at the time of hiring.   6
For the UK Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) used data from the British Houshold 
Panel Survey (BHPS) and a random effects specification finding evidence of state 
dependence in unemployment, a result confirmed by Arulampalam (2002) using a similar 
identification strategy. In addition she finds that the effects were smaller for workers under 
25. Studies on British data that rely on observables for identification include Arulampalam 
(2001) that finds a 14% earnings loss 3 years after an unemployment spell in the BHPS, 
Gregory and Jukes (2001) that uses administrative data and find a short-run effect of 
unemployment incidence and a long run effect of unemployment duration and Gregg (2001) 
using the National Child Development Survey (NCDS) who finds evidence of state 
dependence in unemployment, particularly for men. Gregg (2001) also uses aggregate 
unemployment as an instrument for individual unemployment which, surprisingly, generates 
larger estimates. Gregg and Tominey (2005) study the effects of male youth unemployment 
using the Brittish NCDS and find large persistent wage effects. Burgess, Propper, Rees and 
Shearer (2003) use a different approach and controls for aggregate unemployment and find 
negative effects for the non-skilled of entering the labor market in a cohort with high youth 
unemployment. 
Evidence from other countries are scarce, Hämäläinen (2003) applies a correlated random 
effects model to Finnish data and finds evidence of short-term scarring effects, in particular 
for low-educated workers. Knights, Harris and Loundes (2002) use a similar method on 
Australian data finding evidence of scarring effects of unemployment. Muhleisen and 
Zimmerman (1994) applies a random effects probit to German data and find evidence of   7
short run state dependence.
  Clark, Gorgellis and Sanfey (2001) also use German data and 
show that unemployment leads to long-lasting disutility effects, at least for men.
2 
Little other relevant evidence exists on Swedish data. Exceptions are Åslund and Rooth 
(2007) who find that refugee immigrants that where placed in municipalities with high 
unemployment rates performed worse at the labor market for a long period of time and 
Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) who study the dynamics of welfare receipt among immigrants 
and native Swedes. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that scarring is a real phenomenon.
3 On the other hand, the 
results suggest that the effects are smaller for young workers and, furthermore, estimates of 
scarring effects are likely to be upward biased if the observed covariates or distributional 
assumptions fail to appropriately control for individual heterogeneity.  
 
The economic environment and institutions 
The analysis of this paper is based on data on the cohorts graduating from Swedish high 
schools between 1991 and 1994. The cohorts are followed until the year 2001. This is the 
most turbulent period in the Swedish labor market since World War II, the consequences of 
t h e  c r i s i s  w e r e  e v e n  w o r s e  t h a n  t h o s e  i n d u c e d  b y  t h e  r e c e n t  g l o b a l  r e c e s s i o n .  T h e 
unemployment rate which had been below 5% since the 1960s and was around 2% in the 
late 1980s suddenly increased to 10% in the early 1990s (see Figure 1). The unemployment 
rate remained high until the late 1990s when it started to decline and by the year 2002 the 
                                                   
2 There is also a potentially relevant literature on plant closings. A recent survey is provided by von Wachter (2009). An 
example on Swedish data is Eliason and Storrie (2006) who show that there are significant negative effects of plant 
closings that can be reinforced when the business cycle turns bad, even several years after the initial shutdown. However, it 
is not evident that evidence from plant closings can be generalized to other sources of unemployment, in particular those of 
entering groups.  
3 The main exceptions are the early papers by Ellwood (1982), for employment, and Heckman and Borjas (1980). However 
it should be noted that these papers, as pointed out in the papers themselves, use very small (N = 364 and 122) and non-
representative samples, which suggests that not too much weight should be put on these empirical results.   8
unemployment rate had declined to 5%.
4 The time pattern for youth unemployment showed 
a  s i m i l a r  t i m e  p a t t e r n  a s  t h e  o v e r a l l  u n e m p l o y m e n t  r a t e ,  a l t h o u g h  a t  w i t h  m u c h  m o r e 
pronounced swings due to the higher level. The 1990s also saw a rapid expansion of the 
proportion of the working aged population enrolled in education. As a result, the 
employment to population rates did not recovered as well as the unemployment rates after 
the recession, especially not for younger workers. 
[Figure 1] 
Our empirical model will account for the varying business cycle environment through 
year dummies. Furthermore, in a robustness analysis we will estimate separate effects 
separately for the cohort that graduated in 1991 when labor market conditions still were 
relatively decent in order to see how the estimated effects vary with the business cycle. 
The Swedish educational system requires that all children start school during their 7
th 
year and attend 9 years of compulsory schooling. After finishing 9
th grade (during their 16
th 
year) most students choose to start high school. As an example, 85% of those born 1973 
received a high school diploma before the age of 20. High school students in Sweden are 
enrolled in one of several possible “programs”. During the period of study (1991í94) the 
programs were standardized into three main categories: academic 3-year programs, 
academic 2-year programs and vocational 2-year programs. Most youths progressing to 
tertiary education came from the 3-year academic programs and these will therefore be 
e x c l u d e d  f r o m  o u r  a n a l y s i s .  O n  s o m e  l o c a t i o n s  t h e r e  w a s  a l s o  a  p i l o t i n g  s c h e m e  w i t h 
vocational 3-year programs.
5 Since the role of these programs mainly was as substitutes for 
the shorter vocational programs, they will be included in the analysis. 
                                                   
4 The figure stops in 2004 due to a break in the series which has a large impact on measured youth unemployment.  
5 Due to a reform of the vocational programs in the early 1990s, all Swedish high school students graduating after 1994 
received a 3 year long education that qualifies for university studies. However, this institutional change does not apply to 
the cohorts included in this study.   9
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
There are many reasons for why there may be an association between early unemployment 
and future labor market performance. Following Gregg (2001) we may summarize them as:  
1.  Individual heterogeneity: some people may be more prone than others to poor labor 
market outcomes due to persistent differences in preferences or abilities. 
2.  Labor market persistence: a young worker may become unemployed due to poor labor 
market conditions in the relevant region or occupation. The individual will be more 
likely to be unemployed in the future as well, if the conditions are persistent. 
3.  Scarring: Unemployment in itself may generate unemployment in the future either 
through firm discrimination, human capital depreciation, or other mechanisms. 
More formally we can assume a two-period data generating model. In period 0 the worker 
enters the labor market and in period t we measure the effects of unemployment in period 0. 
Let  i X  be a vector of observed individual specific characteristics, and let  i R  denote an 
unobserved individual specific effect for individual i having the effect Qt at time t. Let
j
it A  be 
the labor market conditions faced by the individual at time t at the labor market j (e.g.  
defined by region and occupation). Allowing for scarring effects in period t we get a model 
determining the unemployment of individual i in period 0 (denoted by  0 i U ) and the labor 
market performance (employment, unemployment, or wages) in period t (denoted by  it Y ): 
  io i
j
io i io R A X U H O E      0 0   (1) 
  it i t io t
j
it t t i it R v U A X Y H J O E         (2)   10 
In our empirical applications of this equation, t will range from 1 to 10 (at most). Our main 
identifying strategy uses sibling fixed effects (Di
S) to proxy for the individual specific effect 






it t t i it u U A X Y       D J O E .  (3) 
Thus, the identifying assumption behind the sibling fixed effects estimates is that all 
differences between siblings that are correlated with both unemployment at time 0 and labor 
market performance at time t are captured by the individual specific variables included in X, 
(i.e. such that cov (uit  , Ui0) = 0 for all t).  
We also estimate an “OLS-specification” where we proxy the unobserved individual 
component by observable family characteristics (Zit) instead of the sibling fixed effect:  
it it t io
j
it t t i it Z U A X Y K I J O E       .  (4) 
This model can only be given causal interpretation if it can be argued that all differences 
between individuals that are correlated with both initial unemployment and subsequent 
performance are captured either by the observed individual specific information (the X-
vector) or the observed family background variables (the Z-vector). The main reason for 
estimating the OLS model is that it greatly increases the sample size and thus the precision 
in the estimates. Since the identifying assumptions are stronger in the OLS specification, we 
will mainly use it to check for differences in estimates between different sub-samples. 
The aim of the applied empirical models is to generate a situation where we are 
comparing two groups that are (conditionally) as similar as possible, where one group did 
become unemployed, and the other did not, and compare the subsequent outcomes of these 
two groups. The logic behind the model can be understood in the context of a standard 
                                                   
6 One common method used in order to identify state dependence is to rely on distributional assumptions such as correlated 
random effects models. However, one drawback with this method is that the underlying assumptions are difficult to 
   11 
model of search frictions (see e.g. Pissarides 2000). Search frictions, empirically 
documented in e.g. Ridder and van den Berg (2003), imply that even identical individuals 
will end up in different states when first entering the labor market due to factors that can be 
treated as purely random. Thus, it should, in theory, be possible to identify scarring effects 
by conditioning on individual characteristics, given sufficiently good data.
7 If, however, the 
identifying assumptions fail, we are bound to overestimate the true effect. We return to this 
issue in the concluding section. 
 
IV. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
The data used in this paper cover four entire cohorts of young individuals graduating from 
vocational and 2-year academic high school programs between 1991 and 1994. We exclude 
3-year academic programs in order to minimize the impact of transitions into further 
education. We also require that the graduates are aged 18 or 19 (the normal ages).  
 
Data 
The general source of data is the IFAU database that combines data from various registers 
from Statistics Sweden and the National Labor Market Board. The original data sources are 
the high school examination registers (UREG) which contain information on grades and 
courses for all high school graduates, a longitudinal income register (LOUISE) that links 
family members to each other and contain information on demographics and socioeconomic 
factors, the employment register (RAMS) containing information on employment and 
                                                                                                                                                            
validate. Furthermore, since we specifically look at the effect of the initial state we only have one observation per 
individual in each regression, making it impossible to include individual-specific random effects. 
7 The use of sibling data in the literature on returns to education has been criticised by e.g. Griliches (1979) and Bound and 
Solon (1999) on concern that if indeed siblings are so alike, why do they end up with different education? In the current 
application the corresponding question would be “why do they end up in different initial states?” Ideally, the true answer is 
“due to matching frictions”.   12 
earnings and an unemployment register (HÄNDEL) which contain information on spells of 
registered unemployment at public employment services.  
 
Education and work experience. The individuals included in this study all graduate from i) 
vocational 2-year programs ii) theoretical 2-year programs or iii) the vocational 3-year pilot 
programs. The programs train students for specific occupations such as child care or auto 
repairs. Each student takes a set of courses, some of which are compulsory for all students in 
the program, and some of which are chosen by the student.
8 Our data includes detailed 
information on course specific grades from which we construct three different variables: 
Overall grade point average (GPA), field specific grade point average (FGPA) capturing the 
average grade in courses that are directly related to the occupational field of the program 
(e.g.  “Construction” for the Construction workers program)
9 and a dummy for students that 
either failed or received the grade 1 (out of 5) in any course (Failed). 
By nature, high school graduates have very little labor market experience. However, we 
use information on labor earnings during the final complete calendar year in high school and 
a dummy for whether the student was employed in November during the same year. The 
idea is that these variables should capture both unobserved ability (e.g. in the form of 
motivation) and potential effects of in-school work experience (see e.g. Häkkinen, 2006). 
 
                                                   
8 The selection of courses taken by each student is a complicated process: Many programs have different specific fields to 
which the students have to apply in advance, e.g. electricians can be either general electricians or specialised on 
telecommunication. In addition, some courses are chosen by the student; typically this choice is between a predetermined 
set of courses which may vary between schools.  
9 The FGPA is constructed from the data by looking at the courses most often taken by graduates of each program, 
excluding general courses such as Swedish and mathematics. The FGPA-variable is the average grade within the specific 
courses taken by each student. The ordinary GPA is used for the (few) students that did not take any field specific courses 
and for all students from the 3-year vocational programs in the piloting scheme since their field specific grades are missing 
in the data. In order to assess the robustness of our results we also estimate a model including only (18-year old graduates 
of ) the 2-year vocational programs.    13 
Demographic variables. A key set of background information refers to the parents of the 
graduates. In constructing these data, step-parents and biological parents are treated equally 
since the data are based on household information. These data are used both to construct 
sibling-pairs and in order to generate family characteristics for the OLS specification. The 
sibling fixed-effects are identified from the identity of the (household) mother. Restricting 
the analysis to children with identical father and mother reduces the sample somewhat 
through the exclusion of graduates from single-mother households but does not affect the 
estimates significantly. 
The observable characteristics of the parents used in the OLS specification captures: 
Immigration status,  Education,  Employment,  Earnings,  Self-employment,  Taxed capital 
income,  Disposable income and  Welfare assistance.  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n s  O L S -
regressions include 2000 parish of residence fixed effects in order to capture more of the 
relevant socio-economic background. An average parish has about 4000 inhabitants. All 
variables are measured during the graduates last year in high school.
10  
Individual-level demographic variables capture year of birth, gender and country of birth 
(Swedish, other Nordic county or the rest of the world). The only individual-level control 
variable dated after the graduation year is a dummy for military service. The Swedish 
military is based on conscription, and as a result, a large fraction of the males (and very few 
female volunteers) enter the military at some point in time. The decision on if, when, and 
how the worker will fulfill his service is usually taken at age 17.we therefore considered it to 
be exogenously determined. 
 
                                                   
10 The exception being data on taxed capital income that is taken from the graduation year since data for 1990 where 
unavailable.    14 
Unemployment and employment. One of the two alternative variables used in order to 
measure initial labor market status is a dummy for whether the graduate became 
unemployed during the year following graduation. The unemployment data captures the 
number of days a worker is registered as unemployed at the public employment service,11 
and a dummy is given the value one if a worker is registered as unemployed for at least 50 
days between September and May, and zero otherwise.12 Unemployment in the subsequent 
years is measured using corresponding definitions. The choice of September to May for the 
measure of unemployment is based on the assumption that registered unemployment 
experiences during the summer months are less informative than the rest of year for young 
workers. The results are robust to changes in the arbitrary cut-off at 50 days in order to be 
classified as unemployed.  
The alternative explanatory variable is employment after graduation. Employment is 
measured using Statistics Sweden’s earnings-based definition which codes workers with 
earnings corresponding to 4 hours of work in November as employed. The same definition is 
also used when employment is used as the outcome variable.  
In addition to studying the effects on employment and unemployment, we will also study 
the effects on log annual labor earnings. In the baseline specification observations without 
earnings are changed to the minimum amount in the data (100 SEK | $15) but we also 
estimate a model conditional on being employed in November, which excludes the zero 
earnings cases. Labor earnings are measured by calendar-year so the analysis of the effects 
of initial unemployment on earnings will start two years after graduation since the first year 
overlaps with the initial unemployment period (see above).  
                                                   
11 We do not include time spent in active labor market programs. Qualitatively, the results are very similar if time spent in 
labor market programs is treated as unemployment.  
12 Graduation typically takes place in early June.    15 
 
Aggregate  covariates.  Aggregate unemployment rates are calculated using the 
unemployment register matched with a population-wide register of education. A program-
specific unemployment-to-population rate (henceforth referred to as “unemployment rate”) 
is calculated for each combination of program, municipality and year using the 50 days May 
to September procedure explained above.13 The calculation is based on individuals aged 21 
to 35 during the graduation year (i.e. they are 3 to 16 years older than the graduates) in order 
to get a measure of the labor market conditions relevant for relatively young workers. An 
overall municipality unemployment rate is also calculated for each year using the same 
procedure and population but without separating the different programs. Furthermore, all 
regressions include dummies for graduation year (interacted with birth year) in order to 
remove effects from aggregate cycles. 
  
Descriptive statistics 
Table A1 in Appendix A shows descriptive statistics for the main time invariant covariates 
used in the analysis. F i g ur e  2  show the development over time for unemployment and 
employment separated by initial labor market performance. It is clear that those unemployed 
after graduation are unemployed during the following ten years to a much higher degree. It 
is equally true that those employed after graduation have a higher probability of being 
employed during the 9 years following graduation.  
[Figure 2] 
                                                   
13 Unique program unemployment rates cannot be calculated for the 3-year vocational programs in the piloting scheme 
since there are no older graduates. The 2-year programs with corresponding occupations are used instead (see Ekström, 
2002, for the correspondences).   16 
 
V. SIBLING FIXED EFECTS ESTIMATES 
The descriptive statistics shows a positive correlation between unemployment after 
graduation and subsequent unemployment. The purpose of this section is to identify causal 
effects of unemployment subsequent to graduation. The identification strategy uses sibling 
fixed effects to remove all unobserved heterogeneity that is common within a family. 
Table 1 shows the raw relationship between the unemployment probabilities of the youngest 
and the oldest child of each sibling pair. The table shows that youths with older siblings who 
were unemployed (employed) at a certain time after graduation have 5-10 percentage points 
higher probability of being unemployed (employed) at the same time after graduation. This 
fairly strong association between siblings, which imply that the risk of unemployment is 
nearly 50 percent higher in relative terms if the older sibling also was unemployed, suggests 
that (potentially unobserved) family background is an important determinant of youth labor 
market outcomes.  
[Table 1] 
The identifying assumption required for the model is that all relevant differences between 
siblings are captured by the individual level variables. These variables are Gender, Age at 
graduation (18 or 19, interacted with graduation year), Oldest sibling (dummy), Type of 
vocational program (dummies), GPA and  Field GPA interacted with program dummies, 
Failed (dummy), in-school employment (dummy) and the log of In-school earnings. Note 
also that included siblings are quite similar in age (at most 4 years in between the siblings) 
as well as educational choice and performance since only graduates from vocational 
programs are included.    17 
In addition to the individual level variables, the estimated linear probability model also 
includes two measures of the contemporary labor market conditions in the original 
municipality.
14 The first is average unemployment among 15 proceeding cohorts of the same 
high-school programs (i.e. occupation) for each year and municipality. The second measure 
is municipality-year average defined over the same population. Table A2 in Appendix A 
shows estimates for the control variables during some of the outcome years. 
Naturally, individuals without siblings in the base sample have to be removed. Table A1 
in Appendix A shows that the resulting sample is very similar to the overall sample in most 
characteristics and Section VI below shows that this reduced sample produces similar results 
as the overall sample when relying on observed characteristics for identification. This should 
ensure that the results we find are not specific to the sibling sample. 
Table 2 shows the estimates of the effects of initial unemployment on future labor market 
performance. Estimates are only calculated for the 7 years (6 when the outcome is other than 
unemployment) for which there are 4 full cohorts since the number of sibling pairs drops 
dramatically if only one cohort is excluded. The effect of post-graduation unemployment is 
statistically significant for all outcome variables during 5 years after graduation: 
unemployment is increased by 3 percentage-points and employment is decreased by about 5 
percentage points. As a comparison, the estimate is of about the same magnitude as the 
(raw) difference between youths (at t = 5) depending on the unemployment experience of 
the older sibling displayed in Table 2. Using employment as the variable measuring initial 
labor market performance gives a similar picture, results are presented in bottom panel of 
Table 2. 
[Table 2]   
                                                   
14 The reason for conditioning on the original municipality is to avoid controlling for endogenous migration patterns since 
   18 
The identifying assumption behind the causal interpretation of the estimates is that all 
relevant differences between siblings are captured by the individual level covariates. In 
order to get some indication of the importance of heterogeneity within a sibling pair, 
Figure 3 shows estimates of models with and without the individual level covariates and 
with and without sibling fixed effects (using the sibling sample and no family background 
variables in all cases). The results show that the individual level covariates make a large 
difference without the fixed effects but only a small difference when the sibling fixed effects 
are included. This is at least an indication that heterogeneity within siblings pairs is of 
smaller importance than heterogeneity across sibling pairs. 
[Figure 3] 
One potential alternative to the sibling fixed effects model is to use aggregate 
unemployment as an instrument for individual unemployment experiences as proposed by 
Ellwood (1982) and implemented by Gregg (2001). As long as aggregate unemployment 
rates are uncorrelated with unobserved individual characteristics, it appears to be a valid 
instrument. However, experiments with this strategy gave two results: First, the standard 
errors are too large for the analysis to be informative. Second, the IV-estimates are much 
larger than the corresponding OLS-estimates. This is in line with the results in Gregg (2001) 
but seems counterintuitive since the point of the instrument is to remove the upward bias 
from unobserved heterogeneity. A likely reason is that high (local) unemployment rates not 
only increases the unemployment probability of the graduates, but also reduces the quality 
of the jobs found, suggesting that the negative effect of poor aggregate conditions is larger 
than estimated by the first stage regression which would imply that IV estimates (using 
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aggregate unemployment as instruments) of future consequences of early unemployment 
spells could be upward biased. 
 
Different forms of duration dependence.  
The seminal paper by Heckman and Borjas (1980) defines four different categories of true 
state dependence: “Markovian dependence” (it takes some time to leave any state), “duration 
dependence” (exit rates may be declining with time spent in a state), “occurrence 
dependence” (the number of previous spells may matter in the future), and “lagged duration 
dependence” (the lengths of previous spells may matter in the future).  
While it is difficult to separate the different forms of duration dependence from each 
other, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the spell lengths are too short to 
explain very long lasting effects, less than a percent of spells lasts more than two years. 
Thus, the longest lasting “scars” are likely to be driven by effects after the interruption of the 
initial spell. Thus, Markovian or (pure) duration dependence cannot be the complete story. 
Furthermore,  Table 3 shows estimates where we separate the effects of occurrence and 
duration of the initial unemployment experience. The results suggest that both lagged 
occurrence and duration are important in the short run, however, with a “declining marginal 
effect” of another day of initial unemployment. In the longer run, however, it appears as if 
the effects of short spells disappears, suggesting that lagged duration dependence is driving 
the results in the longer perspective. Some caution is warranted though since the estimates 
are quite imprecise and few of the differences between estimates are significant. 
[Table 3]   20 
VI. SUB SAMPLE OLS-ESTIMATES 
The sibling fixed effects estimates imply significant effects up to five years after graduation 
and there are some indications of even more long lasting causal effects. The purpose of this 
section is to study the robustness of the results to different sample restrictions and to study 
potential heterogeneity in the scarring effects.  
Using a sibling fixed effects specification comes with a substantial cost in degrees of 
freedom: only 10 percent of the sample is used and the average number of individuals per 
fixed effect is 2.03. Thus, when studying the effects in smaller sub-samples we would 
rapidly encounter problems with too large standard errors (as an example, restricting the 
analysis by gender will reduce the sample dramatically since all mixed sibling pairs would 
be dropped). Instead we use an OLS specification where a rich set of observed 
socioeconomic family background variables act as a substitute for the sibling fixed effects. 
The estimated equations use all available observable family background information (see 
Section III and Appendix A) instead of the sibling fixed effects. The estimated linear 
probability model thus includes variables capturing ethnicity, education, employment, self-
employment, earnings, welfare receipts, disposable income and capital income of the parents 
and geographical location dummies at the parish (sub-municipal) level as well as the 
individual background characteristics and the two measures of labor market conditions 
included in the sibling fixed effects specification.  
In order to highlight the differences in estimates, Figure 4 displays how the estimates 
change when we base the identification on observables rather than the sibling fixed effects. 
Note that the OLS estimates in the figure are based on the siblings-sample in order to isolate 
the difference in estimates between specifications. The OLS estimates are somewhat larger 
in magnitude than the sibling fixed effects estimates; the differences are in the order of one   21 
to two standard errors from the sibling model. The confidence intervals of the OLS estimates 
(not included in the figure) are much smaller since removing the fixed-effects in practice 
increases the degrees of freedom by a factor of almost 2 even without changing the sample.  
The fact that the OLS specifications generate somewhat larger estimates than the sibling 
fixed effects specification probably implies that the OLS estimates are upward biased. 
However, under the implicit assumption that this bias is similar in different sub-samples, we 
find it worthwhile to use the OLS specification to gain the precision we need for sub-sample 
analyses to be informative. The idea is that differences between estimates from different 
sub-samples should be informative even if the estimates themselves are biased. 
[Figure 4] 
Table 4 uses the OLS specification to study the effects of teenage unemployment for the 
for males and females separately. The estimates are very similar for the two genders. It 
should, however, be noted that most of the occupations catered for by the vocational high 
school system are dominated by one gender which makes it impossible to rule out the 
possibility that behavioral differences between males and females are counteracted by 
differences between occupations. The table also show separate estimates for immigrants and 
for the 1991-cohort which entered the labor market when conditions were relatively good. 
Again, the patterns are in all cases consistent with the overall estimates. This finding similar 
to results found in Biewes and Steffes (2010) who study slightly older German workers and 
interpret an insignificant interaction effects with the past aggregate unemployment rate as 
evidence against proposed models of stigma effects. Experiments with other interactions 
(such as grades) do not indicate any substantial heterogeneity in the effects either. Thus, the 
overall impression is that the long-run effects of teenage unemployment are quite 
homogeneous within our sample of young blue collar workers of both genders. 
[Table 4]   22 
Table 4 also shows robustness checks using different sub-samples:
15 It is shown that the 
estimates are insensitive to restrictions on the sample by: i) excluding individuals that 
acquire further education after graduation, ii) only including those that entered the labor 
force directly after graduation, iii) only including 18 year-old graduates from 2-year 
vocational programs. It is also shown that the estimated marginal effects from probits are 
virtually identical to the estimates from the linear probability models. We have also 
estimated all models in Table 4 using employment to measure initial labor market status, and 
the results are in all cases compatible (results are available on request).  
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Young workers that enter unemployment exit much faster than older workers which could 
suggest that youth unemployment is a harmless state requiring little attention from 
policymakers. However, little is known about the long run effects of early unemployment 
experiences. Partly this is because separating causal effects of unemployment from 
unobserved heterogeneity is an intrinsically difficult task. 
The results in this paper show that experiences of unemployment subsequent to 
graduation have negative effects on both unemployment and earnings at least 5 years after 
graduation. Although the effects are far from trivial in size with an increased risk of 
unemployment in the order of 3 percentage points after five years, it is also clear that the 
effect diminishes over time. Thus, the evidence suggests that the effects of teenage 
unemployment are persistent but not permanent.  
It should, however, be noted that it is impossible to rule out with absolute certainty that 
the effects are contaminated by remaining unobserved factors. Although our data handles all 
                                                   
15 Table A3 in Appendix A shows control variable estimates for some of the outcome years.    23 
(persistent) family factors, many aspects related to the individual such as performance in the 
work related subjects and in-school work experience, and local occupation specific 
unemployment rates, some confounding factors may still have been left out. For the 
skeptical reader, our estimates should in that case be viewed as an upper bound of the true 
effects since potential confounders by all likelihood should bias the estimates upwards. 
Thus, the lesson that the effects of early unemployment are unlikely to be permanent holds 
even if the estimates are upward biased due to left-out confounders. 
The results give no direct evidence on the nature or causes of the scarring effects. A few 
things can however be noted: First, the effects survive long after the completed 
unemployment spells (since most spells are short). Second, the size of the effects decline 
over time. Third, there is a short-run effect of both incidence and duration but the effects of 
shorter spells appear to decline faster over time.  
Overall, the estimates presented in this paper suggest a long-lasting, although not 
permanent, negative causal effect of unemployment at the time of labor market entry 
implying that policy initiatives to combat youth unemployment may well be worthwhile 
despite the short average spell-length among young unemployed. More research is however 
needed in order to define the exact mechanisms behind the results.  
The time pattern of the results fit nicely into a story where employers use workers’ 
unemployment history as a screening device when hiring. It seems reasonable that 
(especially short) spells several years ago either are assumed to contain little information or 
are not detected in the hiring process. However, the fact that we find similar effects for the 
cohort who entered before the recession could be interpreted as evidence such an 
interpretation since employers should view their unemployment periods as more informative 
regarding unobservable characteristics. Since we know little about how human capital 
behaves during career interruptions it is difficult to say whether or not the results could be   24 
generated by skill-loss. However, since the effects do not appear to be permanent, it has to 
be the case that time compensates for lost skills (in particular for skills lost during short 
spells) if skill-loss is the explanation.
16  
 
                                                   
16 Seniority rules, on the other hand, are not likely to be a key determinant of these particular results since none of the 
workers included in the study had any tenure to lose before becoming unemployed.   25 
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Table 1: Labor market performance for sibling-pairs. 
  Young sibling unemployment    Young  sibling  employment 
Time after 
graduation (t)  
If older sibling 
unemployed 
If older sibling 
not unemployed 
  If  older  sibling 
employed 
If older sibling 
not employed. 
t = 0  0.30  0.20    0.45  0.38 
t = 1  0.40  0.32    0.57  0.46 
t = 3  0.35  0.26    0.69  0.54 
t = 5  0.21  0.16    0.76  0.66 
Note: The table shows the unemployment (employment) probability of younger siblings depending on whether the older 
sibling was unemployed (employed) at the same time after graduation. The “oldest” sibling is randomly chosen if the birth 
year is the same for both siblings.   28 
Table 2:  The effects of initial unemployment and employment on subsequent labor market 
performance–sibling fixed effects estimates 
          Year after graduation (t)     
  t = 1  t = 3  t = 4  t = 5  t = 6  t = 7 
 
 
  Effects of initial unemployment     
Unemployment (1/0) 
0.074**  0.037**  0.038**  0.031**  0.014  0.015 
(0.013)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Days of 
Unemployment 
11.275**  4.544**  4.626**  4.299**  2.085  2.139 
(1.743)  (1.715)  (1.476)  (1.374)  (1.200)  (1.227) 
Employment (1/0) 
-0.027*  -0.041**  -0.036**  -0.047**  -0.004  -- 
(0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011)   
ln(Earnings) 
--  -0.288**  -0.245**  -0.175**  -0.089  -- 
  (0.061)  (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.058)   
Number of cohorts  4  4  4  4  4  4 
N   17978  17817  17707  17611  17526  17443 
 
 
  Effects of initial employment   
Employment (1/0) 
0.249**  0.074**  0.034**  0.020  0.039**  -- 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)   
ln(Earnings) 
1.354**  0.289**  0.223**  0.121*  0.185**  -- 
(0.045)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.051)  (0.051)   
Unemployment (1/0) 
-0.062**  -0.025*  -0.016  -0.006  -0.016*  -0.012 
(0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Days of 
Unemployment 
-5.166**  -2.018  -1.551  -1.087  -2.238*  -2.999** 
(1.486)  (1.458)  (1.292)  (1.181)  (1.012)  (1.038) 
Number of cohorts  4  4  4  4  4  4 
N   17978  17817  17707  17611  17526  17443 
Note: Sample includes all graduates observed with a sibling in the sample. Linear probability estimates of the effect of 
unemployment/employment subsequent to graduation. Regressions include controls for education (Program, Failed, GPA 
(by program), Field GPA (by program)), Gender, In-school work (log earnings and working in November), Military service 
(after graduation and at time t), program specific municipality unemployment at time t, municipality unemployment at time 
t as well as cohort-birth year interaction dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5% level. 
**Significant at 1% level.   29 
Table 3: Effects of different durations of initial unemployment.  
Days of initial un-
employment (t = 0) 
  Effect on unemployment at year t    Fraction of 
total  t = 1  t = 3  t = 5 
1-20 days  0.050**  0.024  -0.015  8.7%  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.014) 
21-50 days  0.067**  0.026  0.013  12.1%  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
51-100 days  0.092**  0.051**  0.035**  13.6%  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.013) 
>100 days  0.102**  0.041*  0.033*  8.3%  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
Note: Sample includes all graduates observed with a sibling in the sample. Linear probability estimates of the effects of 
unemployment subsequent to graduation on the probability of being unemployed at least 50 days t years later with separate 
effects depending on the number of days of initial unemployment. Regressions include sibling fixed effects and controls for 
education (Program, Failed, GPA (by program), Field GPA (by program)), Gender, In-school work (log earnings and 
working in November), Military service (after graduation and at time t), program specific municipality unemployment at 
time t, municipality unemployment at time t as well as cohort-birth year interaction dummies. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *Significant at 5% level. **Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 5: Sub-sample estimates (OLS-specification) – effects of initial unemployment on future 
unemployment. 
  t = 1  t =3  t =5   t =7   t =9 N(t=1) 
Full sample 
0.117**  0.056**  0.035**  0.026**  0.019**  170,811  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Males 
0.121**  0.052**  0.035**  0.025**  0.018**  96,710  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Females





0.113**  0.055**  0.035**  0.028**  0.021**  61,048  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
1991-cohort only 
0.140**  0.072**  0.045**  0.023**  0.019**  45,205  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
No tertiary education 
0.114**  0.056**  0.033**  0.026**  0.019**  133,634  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
In labor force after 
graduation
 
0.167**  0.087**  0.044**  0.031**  0.020**  91,408  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
18 y.o. grad:s from 
2-year voc. prog:s 
0.110**  0.053**  0.033**  0.025**  0.015**  90,518  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Sibling sample 
0.098**  0.047**  0.048**  0.023**  --  17,978  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
Probit (full sample)
  0.124**  0.057**  0.032**  0.023**  0.016**  170,811  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Number of cohorts  4  4  4  4  2   
N (full sample)  170,811 169,993 168,888 168,036  90,156   
Note: Linear probability (except for “Probit”) estimates of the effects of unemployment after graduation on subsequent 
unemployment. All regressions include program dummies, birth-year dummies interacted with cohort (except “1991-cohort 
only”) and parish fixed effects (except “Probit”) as well as all the controls described in table B1 (GPA and Field-GPA 
effects are interacted with program dummies). “No tertiary education” sample excludes those who achieved any tertiary 
education by 2000. “In labor force” only includes observations that are unemployed or employed at t = 0. “Sibling sample” 
only includes those with siblings observed in the sample. “Probit” reports marginal effects. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *Significant at 5% level. **Significant at 1% level. 
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Figure 2 Unemployment and Employment rates depending on post-graduation unemployment and 
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Years after graduation (t)
FE:s & X:s No FE:s, X:s
FE:s, no X:s No FE:s & no X:s
Note: All models include municipality  unemployment and year dummies. 
 Family characteristics not included in X. All estimates are significant except 'FE:s & X:s', t>5
Estimated effects of initial unemployment on subsequent unemployment
 
Figure 4: Estimates with and without observed individual characteristics (X) and sibling Fixed Effects 












































1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Years after graduation (t)
Sibling FE estimates Upper bound (95 % c i)
OLS estimates (sibling sample) Lower bound (95 % c i)
Note: Confidence intervalls are for the sibling FE estimates. 
 The OLS model includes observable f amily  characteristics.
Estimated effects of initial unemployment on subsequent unemployment
 
Figure 5: A comparison between Sibling Fixed Effects (FE) estimates and OLS estimates: State 
dependence in unemployment.   35 
Appendix A: Covariates  
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Full sample   Sibling 
sample  Females 
No tertiary 
  education 
Failed a course  0.158  0.152  0.140  0.183 
GPA (1-5)  3.111  3.110  3.206  3.007 
(0.614)  (0.607)  (0.608)  (0.589) 
Field GPA (1-5)  3.187  3.203  3.253  3.096 
(0.742)  (0.738)  (0.691)  (0.738) 
2-year theoretical  0.138  0.127  0.196  0.114 
3-year vocational  0.187  0.176  0.166  0.146 
Male  0.566  0.567  --  0.593 
Graduation age  18.4  18.3  18.4  18.3 
Mean cohort  1992.4  1992.4  1992.4  1992.4 
Immigrant  0.042  0.050  0.047  0.043 
Nordic immigrant  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009 
In-school work (Nov)  0.194  0.201  0.226  0.190 
In-school earnings (100 
SEK) 
103.8  106.9  106.5  100.7 
(110.2)  (112.1)  (107.2)  (110.7) 
Ln(Disposable income)  0.616  0.542  0.602  0.593 
(0.385)  (0.314)  (0.398)  (0.381) 
Family on welfare  0.061  0.083  0.063  0.067 
Self-emp. parent  0.099  0.117  0.089  0.100 
Single mother  0.176  0.140  0.186  0.182 
Single father  0.044  --  0.036  0.046 
Living alone  0.030  --  0.043  0.032 
Mother immigrant  0.169  0.107  0.170  0.177 
Father immigrant  0.278  0.224  0.298  0.289 
Both parents imm.  0.100  0.078  0.109  0.105 
Mother working  0.907  0.902  0.907  0.900 
Father working  0.894  0.887  0.894  0.887 
Mother’s earnings 
(100 SEK) 
1195  1145  1187  1167 
(559)  (544)  (553)  (545) 
Father’s earnings 
(100 SEK) 
1874  1805  1871  1815 
(921)  (885)  (917)  (867) 
Military service at t = 0  0.024  0.022  0.000  0.025 
Tertiary education in 
2000  0.204  0.191  0.251  -- 
N  171816  17500  74598  134352 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table A2: Control-variable estimates, sibling fixed effects specification.  
    Unemployment     Employment   
  Year after  graduation  (t)  Year after  graduation  (t) 
  t  =  1  t  =  3  t  =  5  t  =  1  t  =  3  t  =  5 
Failed a course 
-0.008  0.002  0.032*  -0.027  -0.041*  -0.067** 
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016) 
GPA (1-5)
1  -0.051** -0.051** -0.038**  -0.021  -0.054** -0.035* 
(0.017)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Field GPA (1-5)
1  -0.022  -0.030**  -0.006  0.015  0.056**  0.044** 
(0.012)  (0.011)  (0.01)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.011) 
Female  -0.052**  0.009  -0.018  -0.019  0.082**  0.078** 
(0.016)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Oldest sibling  -0.004  0.012  -0.006  0.004  0.001  0.007 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
In-school work (Nov) 
-0.048**  -0.014  -0.001  0.039**  0.008  0.007 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.01)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Ln (In-school 
earnings)  
-0.004  -0.009**  0  0.012**  0.013**  0.004 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Military service after 
graduation
2 
-0.03  -0.002  -0.003  0.252**  0.054  0.070* 
(0.037)  (0.033)  (0.029)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.029) 
Military service at t 
0.085**  0.027  -0.031  -0.202** -0.127** -0.275** 
(0.017)  (0.016)  (0.064)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.077) 
ln(Program/municipality 
unemployment at t) 
0.057**  0.036*  0.024  -0.090**  -0.022  -0.002 
(0.02)  (0.017)  (0.013)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.015) 
ln(Municipality 
unemployment at t) 
0.084  0.118*  -0.023  -0.105  -0.011  0.047 
(0.056)  (0.05)  (0.037)  (0.056)  (0.052)  (0.044) 
Number of cohorts  4  4  4  4  4  4 
N  17990  17830  17623  17990  17830  17623 
Note: All regressions include program dummies, cohort birth-year interaction dummies and municipality fixed effects as 
well as unemployment/employment subsequent to graduation. 
1GPA is interacted with program in all main regressions. 
2Applies to less than 2% of the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5% level. **Significant at 1% 
level. 
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Table A3: Control-variable estimates, OLS-specification (full sample) 
    Unemployment     Employment   
  Year after  graduation  (t)  Year after  graduation  (t) 
  t  =  1  t  =  3  t  =  7  t  =  1  t  =  3  t  =  7 
Failed a course  0.003  0.013**  0.024** -0.049** -0.074** -0.051** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
GPA (1-5)
1  -0.053** -0.033** -0.008** -0.050** -0.059** -0.039** 
(0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Field GPA (1-5)
1  -0.040** -0.047** -0.026** 0.041**  0.061**  0.050** 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Female 
0.064**  0.013**  0.002  0.028**  -0.052**  -0.065** 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Immigrant  -0.003  0.025**  0.022** -0.062** -0.082** -0.056** 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Nordic immigrant
2  -0.004  -0.018  -0.030** 0.059**  0.064** 0.042** 
(0.014)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.015) 
In-school work (Nov)  -0.023** -0.016** -0.006** 0.047**  0.019**  0.002 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Ln (In-school 
earnings)  
-0.013** -0.012** -0.006** 0.026**  0.022**  0.012** 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Disposable income 
-0.007  -0.021** -0.008** 0.023**  0.032**  0.017** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Family on welfare 
0.027**  0.027**  0.019** -0.032** -0.056** -0.038** 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Family’s capital 
income  
-0.585  -1.370  -0.955**  -0.300  -0.604  -0.419 
(1.003)  (0.732)  (0.345)  (0.611)  (0.940)  (0.725) 
Self-employed parent 
-0.031** -0.029** -0.017** 0.028**  0.033**  0.016** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Living with single 
mother 
-0.002  0.004  -0.009  0.001  0.005  -0.001 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Living with single 
father 
-0.023*  -0.002  -0.019** 0.033** 0.038**  0.024* 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Living alone
2  -0.059** -0.042** -0.044** 0.062**  0.058**  0.051** 
(0.011)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Mother immigrant 
0.027**  0.013*  0.022** -0.019** -0.028** -0.028** 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Father immigrant  0.025**  0.014*  0.015**  -0.014* -0.026** -0.018** 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Both parents 
immigrants 
-0.003  0.008  0.001  -0.008  -0.013  -0.01 
(0.009)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Note: Table continues on next page (incl. comments).   38 
Table A3 (Continued) 
    Unemployment     Employment   
  t = 1  t = 3  t = 7  t = 1  t = 3  t = 7 
Mother working  0.011  0.031** 0.022**  -0.015  -0.034**  -0.000 
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Father working  0.021  0.035**  0.005  -0.001  -0.016  -0.026* 
(0.011)  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Ln(Mother’s earnings)   -0.004*  -0.006** -0.004** 0.006**  0.009**  0.006** 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Ln(Father’s earnings)  -0.004*  -0.005**  -0.002*  0.001  0.004*  0.002 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Mother’s education 
(ref. 2-year h.s.)             
Compulsory or less  0.009**  0.006*  0.002  0.013**  0.009**  0.010** 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
3-year high school 
0.003  -0.001  0.003  -0.009  -0.018** -0.014** 
(0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Some tertiary 
-0.011**  -0.005  0.002  -0.026** -0.040** -0.032** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
3-year tertiary or more  -0.016**  -0.009  0.008*  -0.050** -0.069** -0.057** 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Father’s education 
(ref. 2-year h.s.)             
Compulsory or less  0.001  -0.007*  0.000  0.009**  0.013**  0.008** 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
3-year high school  -0.008*  -0.004  0.007** -0.016** -0.019** -0.012** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Some tertiary  -0.013**  -0.009  0.004  -0.030** -0.032** -0.023** 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
3-year tertiary or more  -0.006  -0.006  0.006  -0.050** -0.086** -0.057** 
(0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Military service after 
graduation
2 
-0.021** -0.015*  -0.004  0.247** 0.050** 0.024** 
(0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Military service at t 
0.075**  0.039**  -0.019  -0.176** -0.129** -0.284** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.026)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.050) 
ln(Program/municipality 
unemployment at t) 
0.067**  0.051**  0.017** -0.068** -0.047** -0.008* 
(0.005)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
ln(Municipality 
unemployment at t) 
0.095**  0.090**  0.004  -0.065** -0.047**  0.016 
(0.016)  (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.012) 
Number of cohorts  4  4  4  4  4  3 
N  170,811 169,993 168,036 170,811 169,993 133,954 
Note: All regressions include program dummies, cohort birth-year interaction dummies and municipality fixed effects as 
well as unemployment/employment subsequent to graduation. 
1GPA is interacted with program in all main regressions. 
2Applies to less than 2% of the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 5% level. **Significant at 1% 
level.